Baltic States Grid Synchronization: Addressing Energy Threats in the Baltic Region

Energy has long been used as a geopolitical tool across Europe. During the war in Ukraine, energy assets have been targeted in physical warfare. Russia has systematically been attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, launching missile and drone attacks on power plants and hydroelectric facilities. These attacks display the devastating impact of energy weaponization. Beyond overt attacks, energy infrastructure across Europe has been targeted in more discrete ways as a form of hybrid warfare.

The Baltic states have historically been dependent on Russian energy, due to infrastructure from the Soviet occupation, which left their electricity and hydrocarbon markets intertwined with Moscow. This dependency has created vulnerabilities that can be exploited for political leverage. For example, in a conversation with Saulius Rimutis, Associate Expert at the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center (GSSC), he explained, “Russia spread disinformation and propaganda to prevent the building of a new nuclear power plant in 2012”, aiming to keep Lithuania reliant on Russian energy imports. Before the Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant referendum, Russian-backed media portrayed the project negatively, raising concerns over its safety, environmental impact, and economic viability.

The concerns of Baltic energy dependence on Moscow have heightened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and while the Baltic States had largely moved away from Russian energy, the nature of the threat has evolved. The Baltic Sea has become a hub of undersea infrastructure sabotages and damages, aimed to create internal unrest, instability, and exert economic instability. For example, the Balticconnector pipeline disruption in December 2023 caused gas prices in Finland to rise to €59.72/MWh compared to €39.45/MWh in Lithuania. This highlights the immediate economic impact that damages to infrastructure can cause to countries.

Historically, electricity grids in Baltic countries were linked to the BRELL power system (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). This connection created a dependency on Moscow, which, after the war in Ukraine, was highlighted as a severe vulnerability. Fears across the Baltic states grew around the use of this connection as political leverage. To reduce this risk, the Baltic states pursued a synchronization project to connect the Baltic countries to the European continental electricity network. In February 2025, they completed the connection to the continental grid through the LitPol Link via Poland which has allowed them to reduce their reliance on Russian electricity and the risk of supply disruptions. The synchronization represents a strategic realignment of the Baltic states, demonstrating how small states can enhance their regional energy resilience.

In October 2023, the <EAGLE S> ship was suspected of damaging the Estlink 2 subsea power cable between Finland and Estonia. This was just a few months before the completion of the Baltic states’ synchronization process, reinforcing the risks that sabotage or damage to subsea infrastructure poses to energy security in the Nordic-Baltic Region.

To enhance the resilience of electricity systems, it is important to focus on increasing redundancies in electric routes, prioritizing distributed generation sources, and investing in modern grid technologies that enhance response time and flexibility of the grid, especially with the increase of renewables.

Baltic states have started to take steps to enhance protection of their energy infrastructure more generally. Rimutis stated, “operating companies are becoming concerned about infrastructure security. They are starting to take various measures for the protection of critical infrastructure, such as improving the physical security of infrastructure, purchasing anti-drone systems, buying reserves equipment and improving cybersecurity.” This renewed focus on the security of this infrastructure is not only about deploying new monitoring technologies but also assessing vulnerabilities across all parts of energy supply chains and investing in long-term proactive resilience of critical systems.

Risks to energy systems extend beyond physical vulnerabilities to include supply chain dependencies and the repair capabilities of the infrastructure itself. Part of this focus on resiliency includes ensuring the infrastructure has enough reserves and skilled workforce to repair damages. Subsea electricity cables can be difficult and expensive to repair compared to overhead power lines due to the specialty equipment and vessels needed. Dr. Artūras Petkus, Expert at the Ministry of Energy of Lithuania, stated, that “there are not many ships around the world that are capable of repairing subsea cables.” This leads to longer repair times of weeks or months which delays the restoration of electricity. It is essential to have coordinated protection, maintenance, and repair strategies, ensuring the correct expertise and spare parts are available to respond fast and recover services after grid damage.

The Baltic grid synchronization and proactive investments in enhancing their energy security and building out reserves are a blueprint for how small states can enhance their regional resilience, creating a more stable energy network ready to face direct and indirect challenges that emerge.

Amelia Pilot

Undergraduate Seminar Fellow

Amelia Pilot is a fourth-year student from London in the Vagelos Integrated Program in Energy Research (VIPER) studying physics and material science and engineering. Pilot is also a 2025 Undergraduate Student Fellow.