Four Impediments to Advancing Critical Minerals Trade Negotiations

On February 4, 2026, the Trump administration hosted a Critical Minerals Ministerial to deepen collaboration on critical mineral supply chain resilience and secure partner support for a first-of-its-kind Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals (ATCM) to address global price volatility and distortions caused by China’s non-market practices and market dominance. Since the ministerial, however, progress has been slow, and broad partner support has not materialized. Clarifying four essential aspects of the initiative will be necessary to secure partner buy-in and advance the negotiations.

Overarching Objective

In opening ministerial remarks, Vice President JD Vance emphasized participating countries’ agreement on “a shared strategic objective…[of] diversifying global supply in the critical minerals market.” And he urged partners to join the ATCM negotiations to achieve this objective. So far in the ATCM talks, the United States has focused on the need to increase the competitiveness of U.S. and allied mineral production and processing by raising mineral market prices. But questions about the ATCM’s overall goal remain unanswered. 

For example, the United States has not indicated whether the ATCM is intended to reduce critical mineral dependencies on Chinese-sourced minerals or eliminate them from certain supply chains entirely. This distinction matters for policy design. A price floor may increase supplier diversity and lower price volatility, but it could also allow Chinese producers to sell their products at higher prices while maintaining their market dominance. It is unclear whether the Trump administration would consider this a success. Without an agreed-upon, overarching objective, the negotiations may struggle to get off the ground.

Shared Mineral Priorities

Additionally, the ATCM must accommodate different mineral and supply chain priorities. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. critical minerals agenda has been largely motivated by national security and defense industrial base (DIB) concerns, while clean energy manufacturing has been deprioritized. In contrast, although G7 allies are working to expand their defense capabilities, their DIBs are much smaller, and clean energy supply chains are a bigger focus. Moreover, some trading partners are raw material producers, others specialize in midstream or downstream production, and some, like the United States, have both production and consumption interests. These differences are not insurmountable. Certain minerals, including rare earths, have applications in the clean energy and defense sectors, and critical minerals necessary for battery storage, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence infrastructure could represent overlapping interests. Shared mineral and supply chain priorities and benefits will be essential to a successful negotiation.

Policy Design

ATCM partners will also need to agree on the initiative’s policy design. The U.S. proposal for a tariff-based price floor has not yet gained traction. Instead, partners are focused on other resilience efforts, namely stockpiling, mineral project financing, and research and development (R&D)—policies pursued domestically by the United States as well. Partners have more experience with these policies and view them as potentially more effective and less risky. Furthermore, mineral-rich exporters may not see the strategic benefit of border measures on imports, and importing countries with downstream producers could fear increased supply chain costs from a tariff. 

Alternative approaches may secure broader support if a price floor remains unpopular. The ATCM could deepen cooperation and complementarity among partners’ domestic measures and leverage combined demand to support the commercial viability of government-backed mineral projects. It could also increase R&D collaboration to expand recycling, develop new mineral chemistries, and innovate other ways to reduce reliance on China. As long as the United States remains committed to a tariff-only policy design, and that remains a mismatch with partners’ preferred toolkit, the talks are unlikely to advance.

Self-Reliance v. Collaboration

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the ATCM negotiations will need to resolve tensions between self-reliance and collaboration. U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration has been defined by the unilateral imposition of tariffs and by after-the-fact negotiations with trading partners to lower them. Notwithstanding the February ministerial, the United States has not assuaged concerns that it might negotiate a U.S.-specific minerals outcome with China or pursue unilateral price floor action if partners do not support its proposal. Partners also remain uncertain about how the ATCM will benefit all participants. Countries most vulnerable to China’s weaponization of critical mineral dependencies will likely balk at agreeing to the ATCM if doing so could provoke coercion from China without materially strengthening their supply chains.

The United States cannot secure its critical mineral supply chains alone. As long as these four areas remain unresolved, the ATCM negotiations may not achieve plurilateral support nor critical mineral supply chain diversification and resilience.

Nora Todd

Senior Fellow

Nora Todd is a senior fellow at the Kleinman Center. She served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International Economics and Labor to President Biden.